The Hard Problem

[thedeemon]

У Шона Кэрролла в подкасте вышла отличная беседа с David Chalmers о трудной проблеме сознания (про "легкую проблему" тоже говорят): попытках понять что это (и есть ли оно, здесь же квалиа и пресловутые философские зомби), как оно может соотноситься с физикой, в том числе квантовой, о многочисленных подходах к попыткам дать ответы, и немного на смежные темы - ИИ, симуляции и пр. Хорошо показывают, в чем именно проблема состоит. Никаких определенных ответов не дают, но порадовало, насколько широкий спектр идей специалисты рассматривают, насколько глубоко продумывают, и какие интересные вопросы там получаются. Послушать или скачать можно здесь.

Comments

[pbl]

First time I hear random walk (or random directed walk) is non-computable.

[sassa_nf]

:-) Not in the sense Turing intended!

[pbl]

> Not in the sense Turing intended!

>>>> You're saying this as if brains have been reproducibly inventing diagonalization arguments throughout the human history.

Seriously, before talking about brains doing something non-computable I, personally, would require a much higher standard that it (whatever it is) is 1) actually reproducible 2) actually non-computable. This would have been a shattering scientific - not philosophical - breakthrough, and I find it very hard to even imagine that happening. We can compute the non-computable, like BB(4). It's no big deal, if you thrash around long enough. But let's say the brain can compute something unknowable, like BB(2000)... We can't even verify that "computation", so, like... how would that actually happen apart from the "deffo a seven" scenario? How would we convince ourselves that the result is, in fact, correct?

And barring such a result, that I can't even properly imagine, all discussions about brains possibly "doing" something non-computable are, in my humble opinion, morally equivalent to discussions of there possibly being an almighty creator of all that is, who might even possibly have a bushy white beard. It's very unockhamic. (Hey, is invention of stupid words on the fly non-computable? TAKE THAT YOU STUPID ROBOT IDIOTS.)

[sassa_nf]

That sure would have been stunning. Convincing ourselves is required in many more cases than we'd like to admit. Where was that article that even superexponentiation cannot be proven to work for all natural numbers - because all that we have is induction.

But Turing defines computability in a very specific sense, which unfortunately excludes things like "thrashing around long enough". No?

[pbl]

> which unfortunately excludes things like "thrashing around long enough"

In what sense? Are you claiming that constraint satisfaction problems are not computable? Are you claiming that the fact that Cantor found that proof somehow makes human brain the perfect, ultimate oracle for theorem proving? Are you claiming that the fact that we solve discrete optimization problems by approximate and/or probabilistic methods somehow makes them non-computable? What's so magic about diagonalization argument? Can you prove that it's impossible to find by exploring the derivation space in an appropriate axiomatic system? I just don't get what the gist of your argument is.

[sassa_nf]

"Thrashing around long enough" and "constraint satisfaction problems" are different. Some CSP may even have an algorithm (but we resort to "thrashing around long enough", because of the size of the problem; and then - pseudo-random thrashing does not necessarily explore the whole solution space, so there goes "are computable" out the window; and "real" random thrashing cannot be described algorithmically, so there goes "are computable" out the other window).


"what the gist of your argument is"

I don't know if my argument even makes much sense. But I think the problem is that we do not even know for sure whether "thrashing around long enough" explains it (like, can we show exactly how the intelligent behaviour emerges from such thrashing), or there is a better explanation. It is not necessarily "dualism", but perhaps "more-information-needed-ism".

Whatever Cantor showed, is not necessarily the indication of a perfect brain. It is an indication of a problem that we clearly do not know how to solve, except through "thrashing long enough".

My argument is that if it is indeed "thrashing long enough", then it is not computable in the sense Turing introduced the term. If we can't systematically solve problems, then how can we hope to build anything artificial that can do that systematically? (Don't we need that something to demonstrate some property systematically, so we can state the said thing has been accomplished?)

[pbl]

> If we can't systematically solve problems, then how can we hope to build anything artificial that can do that systematically?

What does this have to do with "Can the brain do only things that are computable?"? Humans suck at proving theorems (especially if we consider population as a whole). So do computers. So what?

I've yet to observe anything that would incline me towards dignifying the hypothesis of our brains doing something supra-Turing in nature with serious consideration. Quite the contrary, what little evidence I could obtain and process indicates the opposite. Or we wouldn't be so prone to seeing Virgin Mary on some random piece of toast. And yet we have the gall to ridicule our poor computer slaves and minions when they mistakenly label foo as bar, or censor someone's face as "obscene". Ha ha, those damn stupid robots. They can never imitate what we luminous creatures can do.

> we do not even know for sure whether "thrashing around long enough" explains it

I'm not a mathematician. I'm fine with not knowing things for sure. Ockhamic and bayesian reasons for believing something, are a good enough substitute of surety for me.

Seriously, that's the whole point of my argument. The fact that there are two possibilities does not yet mean they deserve equal consideration.

[pbl]

> WHAT LITTLE EVIDENCE I COULD OBTAIN AND PROCESS INDICATES THE OPPOSITE

Damn, that's /r/totallynotrobots material right there.